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WES'fMINSTEI~ MEMORIAL PARK (a Nonprofit Corpora-
tion), Respondent, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE et al., 
Appellants. 
[la-Ic] Taxation - Exemptions - Cemetery Property.-Property 
purchased by plaintiff, a nonprofit cemetery corporation, from 
a profit cemetery corporation which obtained the property 
from a family under percentage sales contract whereby it was 
to pay the family 25 per cent of the sales price of all grave 
or interment space sold, and "used or held" by plaintiff "ex-
clusively for the burial or other permanent deposit of the 
human dead," not for its profit, was exempt from taxation 
under Const., art. XIII, § lb, exempting cemetery property 
from taxation "except as used or held for profit," such prop-
erty not being "used or held" by plaintiff for the benefit of 
the sellers with whom it was not engaged in a joint venture 
or partnership and for whom it was not their alter ego or 
trustee, though it purchased the property subject to the per-
centage sales contract, the property being owned by and as-
sessable to it. Where the sellers had no beneficial or assessable 
interest in the land, the existence of a mere general creditor-
debtor relationship between them and plaintiff did not defeat 
the exemption. 
[2] Id.-Exemptions-Constitutional and Statutory Construction. 
-The rule that constitutional provisions and statutes granting 
exemption from taxation are strictly construed against the 
exemption does not require that the narrowest possible mean-
ing be given to words descriptive of the exemption, since a 
[1] Scope and application of exemptiun of cellleteries from taxa-
tion, note, 168 A.L.R. 283. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 92. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Taxatiun, § 70; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 524. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Taxation, § 79(5); [2] Taxa-
tion, § 69. . 
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fllir 111111 1"I':I~()nahll' intl'rl'rl'iatinll 11I::,t 1:1' n:ac1e of nil InlY~, 
with uu(' n'.~nl·(l for till' ordinnry :w('l'ptntion of the 11l11~llngc 
l'\l1ployed :111(1 the I)hjl'<'t ~(lI1;!"ht to hI' n(,(,olllpli~h('(l. 
[3] Id.-Exemptions-Cemetery Property.·-The words "uRed or 
hl'ld for profit," ns used in Const., nrt. XIII, § lb, exempting 
cemeh'ry property froill tnxntinll "ex('ept as held or used for 
profit," lIl11~t lIeccs~uri1y lllean thnt the property is exempt 
unless used or held for prolit of the tuxpayer. 
[4] Id.-Exemptions-Celnetny Property.-"Profit," as used in 
Const., art. XIII, § lb, does 1I0t menn financial benefit thnt 
accrues to 11 cemetery as>;oeiation through the sale of bul'iul 
space Ilt a price in excess of its cost where such gain is used 
for the upkeep of the cellletl'ry property; it means net earn-
ings the benefits of which accrue directly 01' innirectly to the 
stockholders or 1I1elllhers of the association. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
County. John Shea, Juuge. Judgment affirmed in part; 
appeal dismissed in part. 
Action for a refund of taxes collected on property used by 
a nonprofit cemetery corporation exclusively for the burial 
or other deposit of the human dead. Judgment for plaintiff 
against defendant county, affirmed; appeal as to other de-
fendants, dismissed. 
Joel E. Ogle, County Counsel, Stephen K. Tamura and 
John H. Dawson, Assistant County Counsel, for Appellants. 
Clock, 'Waestman & Clock, Henry H. Clock, Holbrook, 
'1'arr & 0 'Neil, 'V. SUllIner Holbrook, Jr., and Herman F. 
Selvin for Respondent. 
Fitzgerald, Abbott & Beardsley, Musick, Peeler & Garrett 
and Melvin D. Wilson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Re-
spondent. 
PE'rERS, J.-This appeal involves the question as to 
whether property purchased by the plaintiff, 'Yestmillster 
Memorial Park, a nonprofit cemetery assodatioll, under a per-
centage sales price contract, and used or held by it cxclush'cly 
for the burial or other deposit of the human dead, is exempt 
from taxation ulluer article XIII, section lb, of the state Con-
stitution. 'rhat section, adopted in 19~6, provides: "All prop-
erty usP!l 01' \1('\(1 I'xl'lusi\"\'ly 1'01' till' lHII'inl or other permanent 
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(1('1Io"it of the hlllll,lIl dea(1 or for the l'are, mailliellaIll'e or up-
keejl of sueh propcrty 0,' SHe'll tlc'<1,I, ('xeept as lI~,e(1 or held for 
profit, s11all be fret' frolll laxation all,1 loeal a"ses~lllellt." The 
('QUilty allli the othe'r def('ntl:mt,,! lIrg:c'd at the trial, and the 
('(Hlnty urges here, that the property involved was "held or 
ll,ed for profit" H1Hl is thererore snbjl'"t to taxation, The trial 
,'ourt hl'l<1 that the property is exempt :11ld gralltetl its judg-
Illent ill favor of plailltiff for the tax(:s lcviNI and colleeted by 
the county of Orange, In our opinion that juugment should 
1)(' affirmed. 
The property inYol"e(1 eonsi"ts generally of unsold grave 
~iles, unsold mausoleum crypt" and other property used in 
l'(llllledion with the cemetery operation. It isadlllitted that 
plailltilf is a nonprofit ccmetery a,-;soviation. It has no slock 
or stockholders. It is cOllcede,1 that all of its il1eome i,; spellt 
in the maintenance, opemtion t!ll(} upkeep of the eemetery. 
Upon dissolution, its assets 'rill be llistributed to the trustees 
of an endowment rare fund. Defrilllant rOllee!les that the 
property in question is "used or hiel exclusively for the burial 
0:' other permanent deposit of the human dead or for the ea1'e, 
maintenanee or upkeep of such propert~·" within the meaning' 
ot' the constitutional provision, and further concrrles that HOlle 
of the property is "used or held" Jor the profit of the cemetery 
as~o('iation. It is the theory of the defendant eounty, hO\\'eyer, 
that the property is "held" by t!lC' plaintiff for the "nse" 
and" profit" of the former owners, the sellers of the property, 
because of the form of the contrad under ,,,hi('h plaintiff is 
purchasing the property from the former o,Yners. 
The case was submitted to the trial comt upon stipulated 
facts. It there appears that the present ccmetery land was at 
one time owned by the Mc \Vhillney family. 'rhey sold it to a 
profit cemetery eorporation, plaintiff's predecessor in interest, 
under a percentage sales price contract whrreby the McWhin-
Heys agreed to eOllvey the land to the profit corporation, and 
that corporation agreed to tlenlop the land as a ccmetery. The 
corporation agreed to charge a minimum price for bnrial plots, 
and to pay thr Me\Vhinllr~'s as the pur,·lta>;c price of the land 
'The plaintifl name.l in its complaint the )li,lway City f'\anitary Dis· 
trict an<l Don S. MozlPy, the tax collector of 111c ('Olmty of Orange, as 
tle,fcndants along with the ~ounty of Orange. ,\1I threc ,ll'fcn.lnnls :In· 
swcred. Thc trial court, howcycr. granted it~ judgment ngaiust the 
connty alolle. "",,\'crthelcs", all three ,l~f,'n'hnts purported to appeal 
from thl' ju,lgmcllt. The ~!idway City S~:nitary Disl rid all<1 the tax 
(;ol1ector hay" :lPPl'[\lt'.l from n jll<h:l1lc'nt tklt, '" In tll"IlI, i~ nOlll'xist·2nt. 
Their purpo)·ted appeals should, therefore, he dismiss!',1. 
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25 per cent of the sale;; pril:e of all grave or interment space 
sold, after alloeations to the elllloWlllcllt care fund, with a 
minimum payment of $4,000 a ycar, togctht'r with a perccntagc 
of the saIl's price of 111C1u;;oleum spacc sold calculated ill ac-
cordance with a dctaile,l forlllula. In 1054 the plaintiff, ad-
mittcdl~Y a nonprofit corporation, ol)taincd the property from 
the profit corporation, and as part of the considcrat iOll for the 
transfer assumed the liabilities and obligations of the profit 
corporation uuder the pcrcelltage sales price contract. It was 
stipulated that this agrermcnt was fair and rt'<1sollable. 
The property sold by the ~IcWhilllleys to the profit corpora-
tion ill 1952 was unilllprOycd land. Since that time, first the 
profit corporation and later the plaintiff, as contemplated by 
the sales agrct'lllellt, h:1\"c dc\'elopccl the land into a cemetery, 
and the entire area has bCl:ome burial sites, mausoleum crypts, 
or is used for purposes incidental to the cemetery. 
The Mc'Vhinnc~Ys were the sole stocldlOlders of the profit 
corporation. All of tllL'ir stock was sold to the nonprofit corpo-
ration as an illcitlellt of the transaction wherehy the plaintiff 
acquired the asscts of the profit corporation. The contrad 
between the parties rcquired the M(' 'Vhinneys to execute a 
grant deed to the nonprofit corporation, forthwith. It is con-
ceded that this wao; done, and that the property is, and since 
1954 has been, reeordcd in the name of, and assessed to, thf> 
plaintiff. It was stipulated that this oWliership by the plaintiff 
is subject to the terms and conditions of the percentage sales 
price contraet. 
No contention is made that the plaintiff nonprofit corpora-
tion was organizcd or is b('ing operatcd for the ultimate benefit 
of the :M~'Vhinl1eys. It was stipulated that payments for 
their serviccs to the Offil'CI'S, directors or trustees of plaintiff 
corporation wcre reasonahle. It was also stipulated that no 
issue was raiscd as to the reasonableness or fairness of either 
the sale of stock to plaintiff, or the transfer of the property 
to plaintiff, suhject to the t('rms of the percentage pril:e agree-
ment. The county cXP1'('s:,ly disclaims reliance on any theory 
that the relationship h('t\\'c(>11 the :Mc"~hinney famil,\Y and the 
plaintiff corporatioll, ('reatNl a joint venturc or partnership. 
There is neither plea(lillg 1101' proof, and it is not contended, 
that the plaintiff is the alte,. cuo of the sdlel'f!, or that it holds 
the property in trllst for the sellers. 
[la] The }ll'Oblell1 p,'cs(,llted to this "ourt is this: Th'! 
plaintiff nonprofit ('orporation has legal title to the land, all(I 
, 
I . 
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the lalld is assessed to it. The property is "used or held" by 
plaintilf "exclusively for the burial or other permanent de-
posit of the human llead or for the care, maintenance or upkeep 
of such property or such dead" wi thin the mcaning of article 
XIII, section lb, of the state Constitution. The property, 
aumittedly, is not "used or held" for the profit of plaintiff 
within the mealling of the provision. The property is being 
purchased unuer a percentage sales price contract. The plain-
tiff, however, is, admittedly, not engagcd in a joint venture 
or partnership with the sellers, nor is it the alter ego of, or 
trustee for, the sellers. Is such property being "used or held" 
by the plaintiff for the benefit of the sellers within the meaning 
of the constitutional provision' Obviously not. 
It is the theory of appellant that respondent nonprofit cor-
poration was organized and is obliged to develop the purchased 
lands for cemetery purposes and to sell graves and crypts for 
the profit and benefit of itself and the former owners. Un-
doubtedly as the cemetery is developed both the respondent 
and the sellers make a profit caused by the enhanced value of 
the land. It is urged that the beneficial ownership of the land 
is at least partially in the sellers and that therefore property 
is "used or held" by the nonprofit corporation for the sellers. 
Hence, so it is argued, the property is subject to taxation. 
Running through appellant's argument is the thought that in 
some way the sellers of the land have retained some interest 
in or control over the land. But this innuendo is contrary to 
the record. Appellant concedes that the buyer and sellers are 
not joint venturers, and that they are not partners. There is 
no evidence, proof or contention that the buyer is the alter ego 
of the sellers. There is no evidence, proof, or contention that 
the buyer is the trustee for the sellers. 
The trial judge, the Honorahle John Shea, stated the issue 
very clearly. He concluded that there is "no way by which 
the tax imposed upon the plaintiff can be npheld." After stat-
ing that, under the stipulated facts, the plaintiff is a nonprofit 
corporation, that all the property is uscd or held exclusively 
for cemetery purposes, and tha~ unucr the percentage sales 
price contract the sellers realize a profit from the sale of the 
cemetery land, the court pointed out that "the tax in this ease 
is not assessed against the Mc'Vhilllleys but rather is assesscd 
against the plaintiff, which is stipulated to be a bona-fide nOll-
profit corporation." 
The court then continued: "It occurs to me that if the 
) 
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corporation were the alter ego of the members of the Mc\Yhil1-
ney family, the court could disregard the corporate <'nUty and 
uphold the tax against the corporation. Howevcr, altl'r cgo 
has not been pled [sic] in this case, and the stipulated facts 
show no connection bei\veen the Mc,Vhinlley family and the 
corporation .... Under this state of pleading and proof, 
alter ego cannot he applicable. 
"Accordingly, it is my judgment that the land in question 
is not' used or held for profit' of the plaintiff, and that the 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment." 
The problem is really quite simple. The land is owned by, 
and assessed to, the plaintiff, admittedly a nor, profit cemetery 
association within the meaning of article XIII, section] b, of 
the Constitution. Admittedly, all of its income from the sale 
of burial sites and crypts is spent in the maintenance and 
operation of the cemetery. It is a stipulated fact that all of 
the assessed property is "used or held exclusively for the 
burial or other permanent deposit of the human dead" within 
the meaning of the Constitution, and that none of the assessed 
property is "used or' held" for the profit of the cemetery 
association. 
The sole connection of the Mc,Vhinneys to this property is 
that they are the sellers of the property and hold a contract 
whereby the purchaser agrees to pay them the purchase price 
based on a percentage of the sales. The sellers retain no pres-
ent interest of any kind in the property sought to be taxed. 
Both the legal and beneficial titles are in the buyer. The rela-
tionship between the sellers and buyer is simply that of credi-
tor and debtor, that is, from a legal standpoint, the sellers are 
merely the creditors of the buyer. In the absence of an alter 
ego theory, or of a joint venture, partner;;hip or trust, the 
property is owned by, and assessable to, the buyer. The sellers 
have no assessable interest in the land, and, in the absence of 
one of these relationships, it cannot be held that the buyer is 
holding the land for the use of the sellers. 
The appellant seems to think that there is some magic in the 
form of the pure11ase contract, that is, that because the sellers 
receive a percentage of the sales price of the burial crypts, an 
ordinary creditor-debtor relationship is converted into some-
thing else that makes an otherwise nontaxable property tax-
able on the theory that it is being "used or held" for the 
benefit of the sellers. It is true, of course, that the sellers 
receive a benefit from the sale of the cemetery lands, but this 
\VI·;~T~II:\::;TEn. :\h:~romAL PARK V. l~4 C.2d 
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benefit is no different illllatnre from the Lenefit received by all 
the creditors or the cemde!'Y association. Obviously, ill a very 
limited sense', the cemetery property i~ being" used or held" 
for the benefit of all of the e!'editors of the cemetery associa-
tion, but it would be absurd to cOllte'nll that beeause the eellle-
tery association has general cl'cLlito!'s it is deprived of the 
exemption. Such a COllstruction would defeat the very pur-
pose of the exemption. In apparent recognition of the absurdity 
of such an argument appellaut concedes that the existence of 
a mere general creditor-debtor relationship docs not defeat the 
exemption. The concession is in aCl"ord with the Jaw (Shennan 
v. Quinn, 31 Ca1.2d 661 [192 P,2tl17]). 
The percentage price contract hl'l'(, im-olved does 110t 
ehange the legal relationship of the partie.;, The sellers arc 
general creditors of the buye!·s. The manner and mode of 
payment, whether by a fixe(l pUl'l·hase pl'iee or a sliding 
purchase price, is of no legal significance so far as the tax 
assessor is concerned. As long as there is 110 legal domination 
by the sellers, the relationship remains that of debtor and 
creditor. Neither a creditor who has a fixed amount owing 
to him, nor a creditor who is entitled to a pereentage of the 
sales price, has any beneficiat'illterest in the lands involved. 
The respondent, 011 oral argument, pointed out that, in the 
cemetery business, it is the general custom to hire salesmen of 
burial crypts 011 a per<:entagebasis. If the percentage eOlltract 
here involved deprived the nonprofit cemetery association of 
its exemption, so would the percentage salesmen contracts. To 
argue that, in sueh a case, the IJroperty is being" used or held" 
for the profit of the salesmell is patently absurd. 
[2] ~A..ppel1ant places considerable reliance on the rule that 
tax exemptions are to be construed most strongly against the 
exemption. That rule offers 110 solace to the appellant. Even 
if the exemption be construed most strictly against respondent, 
it still would be entitled to the exemption. The rule does not 
require that the language of the Constitution should be dis-
tOl'ted or even limited to its narrowest meaning, In Cedars of 
Leba.llon IIospital v. County of Los .. :iuacles, 33 Ca1.2d 729 
! 221 P.2d 31, 15 A.I.l.H.2d 1043], this comt, ill interpreting 
the so-called welfare exemption, stated (p. 734) : 
"Constitutiollal provisions and statutes granting exemp-
tion from taxation arc stri<:tly constru~d to the end that such 
eOllcession will be neither enlarged nor ('xtellded beyond the 
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Ccmetcry .1ssociation v. San Frallcisco, 211 Cal. 387, 3aO 
l295 P. 813]; San F/'a)/ci,;~o v. S,/Il JIatco, 17 Ca1.2d 814, 817 
[112 P.2d 595].) 
"nut the rule of strict construction doC's Hot requil'C' that 
the na rrowest possible meallillg be giWll to worus descriptive 
of the exemption, for a fair anu reasonable interpretatioil 
mu~t be madc of all la\ys, \vith due regard for the oruinal'Y 
aceeptation of the language employed and the ohjeet sought 
to be accomplished thereby. [Citing casC's and other authori· 
ties.] " 
[3] The won1s "uscu or held for profit" as used in the 
con~titutional provision under cOll,;ideration ~nllst nc~C'ssarily 
mean that the property is exempt unless" used or held for 
profit" of the taxp.,yel'. [1 b] Here it is a stipulated fact 
that the property is not" used or held for profit" of the tax-
payer. In the absence of any relationship such as joint Ycn· 
turer, partner, alter ego or trustee bchwen the parties, the 
property is not being" used or held for profit" of the sellers, 
but is being held by respowlcnt solely and exclusively for 
cemetery purposes. 
It must be rememoerC'd that the type of contract here in 
use was not a device dreamed up by the respondent and the 
sellers as a means of avoidin;:r taxes. This type of contraet 
is well-known to thc law, and has been llsrd in the cemetery 
field for many years. It has been in usC' in California at least 
since 1880. In that year sC'etion 611 of the Civil Code2 was 
amended expressly to authorize eel11C'tery associations to C'l1tC'r 
into percentag-e sales priee contracts similar to the one here 
involved. Indeed it is contendC'd in the briC'fs of respondC'nt. 
and not denied by appellant, that most of the eC'l11eteriC's and 
mausoleums in California have been so financed. Be tlJat 
as it may, it is quite apparent that in la26 when art ide XIII, 
'Section 611 of the Civil Code as nmcn<1e(1 in 1880, lln.1 as it read until 
its repeal in 1D31, read. in part: "Such corporations mny also a;:T<'" 
with the person or pCf,ons from whom cemetery lun<ls shall be purrhasPiI 
to pay for SIH'h land., as the pure-hase price thcceof, nny specified share 
Of portioJl, not exce(',1in;:: one·hnlf, of the procP('(1" of ull snIps or lots or 
plats ma<1e from slIch 1:1I1(Is; slI"h pa:mlcnt to be made nt snelt iJlter\'al~ 
as may be :I~rep.l "pOll •••• " This statute \V:lS copied nimost verhatim 
from the ~.;('\\' Yor'k nlll'!,1 (\'lllctery Act of lS-H (N.Y. Laws ISH, eh. 
133) as Rlllt'n·1et! in 1~,,3 (N.Y. Laws lS:;:l, eh. 1~~). The New YOfk 
statute al'o provided for tax cx."nption of such land •. Califomia .li.1 
not provi,k RUl'h exemption until l\)~li. Section Ull W!\~ fe-peale(] in 1031 
by the adoption of tile G,'ner[ll ('<'mdt'fY Ar·t of 1!):1l (Rtat~. In:\!, eli. 
1148, pp. ~434. 2·\o':il). Thp pr~sPllt ('r1lld"r~' law is to be fOItH(1 ill tl,e 
Health an<l Safety Co. Ie, § 8100 1 hrongh ~ ~ll)ii. 
) 
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section 1b, of the Constitution was adopted, the percentage 
sales price contract had been ill 11"(> in this state for at least 
46 years. If there had be(>n all~' int(>llt to tax property pur-
('hased under such ('ontract::; the drafters of the amendmrllt 
would have said so. The~T did 110t. Quite to the contrary, 
they used language that indi,:ates that propl'rty used for 
burial purposes is to be exempt unless "used or held for 
profit" of the cemetery association. 
A proper interpretation of the meaning of the phrase 
"used or held for profit" within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provision is to be found in the case of CYPI·c.~s Lawn 
Cemctery Association v. San Francisco, 211 Cal. 387 [295 
P. 813]. There the cemetery association claimed an exemp-
tion for a hotel building owned by it upon the ground that 
the profits from the hotel flowed back into the perpetual care 
fund. It was held that the hotel was "used or held" for the 
profit of the cemetery asso('iatioll and was taxable to it. The 
court reiterated the doctrine that eOllstitutional provisions 
"exempting property from taxation are strictly construed" 
(p. 390) and held that the hotel was not used exclusively for 
cemetery purposes even though its income was devoted to 
such purposes. This decision is sound. . 
There are two other decisions that throw some light on the 
proper interpretation of the cOIl{>titutional provision. They 
are San Gabriel etc. Assn. v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. 
App.2d 624 [122 P.2d 330], and Pomolla etc ... tsSlI. v. Board 
of S1Ipe1'visors, 49 Cal.App.2d 626 [122 P.2d 327]. In the 
San Gabriel case it was contended that when a nonprofit ceme-
tery association sells burial rights in excess of their cost a 
"profit" is realized and therefore such lots are" used or held" 
for profit. The appellate court stated: "It may not be held 
herein that lots sold at a price in excess of their cost are sold 
'at a profit' as the word is used in article XIII, section 1b" 
(p. 626) citing several cases, and in particular lV ashcll i 
Cemctery Assn. v. King County, 158 Wash. 599 [292 P. 101]. 
[ 4] Of particular interest in the present ease is the follow illg' 
language used by the court, also on page 626: "The word 
'profit' does not rncanfinancial benefit that accru('s to tIll' 
association through the sale of burial space at a price in exces" 
of its cost where such gain is used for the upkeep of the 
cemetery property. The word 'profit' in article XIII, section 
1b, means net earnings the benefits of which accrue directl~' 
or indirectly to the stockholders or members of the associa-
) 
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tion." Teste(l by that :-,tandard there is 110 "pl'Ofit" in the 
instant case "'ithin the meaning of article XHI, section lb. 
'fhat this is so. i~ eh'arly shown by the \Va,;helli case cited, 
all(1 relied upon, in the San Gabriel east', where the Supreme 
COllrt o[ Washington held that there is 110 profit to the ceme-
tery association within the Illeaning of its statutes when the 
property is being pun·hascd on a percentage price sales con-
tract. 
In the Pomona case, supra, the taxing authorities contended 
t hat the unsohl portions of eenwtery lands were not being held 
for burial purposes but for sale. It was contended that the 
unsold plots wcre not being held by the cemetery association 
exclusively for burial purposes, and were, therefore, taxable. 
This contention was found to be without merit, the court 
holding that upon dedieation of the land to the interment 
of the human dead the property bt'came exempt. 
[1e] The rationale of these cases supports the conclusion 
in the instant case that the property is not subject to taxation 
so far as the cemt'tery association is concerned. The rights 
or liabilities of the sellers of the property are not here in-
volved. But, so far as the cemetery association is concerned. 
it is simply the debtor of the sellers, is the owner of the land 
and devotes it and the profits therefrom to cemetery purposes, 
and is therefore tax exempt. 
The purported appeals by the Midway City Sanitary Dis-
trict and by Don S. ~Iozley, Tax Collector of the County of 
Orange, having been taken from a nonexistent judgment, are 
dismissed. The judgment against the County of Orange is 
affirmed. 
Schauer, J., McComb, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgment 
for the reasons stated by Mr .• J ustiee Coughlin in the opinion 
prepared by him for the Distriet Court of Appeal ill this case. 
(Westminster Memorial Park v. County of Orange (Cal.App.) 
2 Cal.Rptr. 527.) 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
